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M ovements in property prices can pose severe risks to those who hold real estate assets as well as to the financial sector and even macroeconomic stability. A vivid example is the global financial crisis of 2007–2009, when 
approximately eight million American homes were foreclosed, and $7 trillion dollars 
in home equity vanished (in this journal, Goodman and Mayer 2018). The sharp 
decline in US housing prices and how it echoed through the US financial system was 
a primary driver of the Great Recession of 2007–2009 (Gertler and Gilchrist 2018). 
This connection goes well beyond the US economy. Many past financial crises have 
shown a connection to house-price risk because irrational and exuberant periods 
are often paired with property booms and bubbles. It is well known that in many 
major economies, house-price growth is related to financial stability, particularly in 
those countries that use variable-rate mortgages and market-based property valu-
ation for mortgage loans (Tsatsaronis and Zhu 2004). The interaction of housing 
price, household debt, and the financial sector can help explain how the Great 
Recession affected high-income countries around the world as well as explain 
economic fluctuations around the world going back to the 1970s (for example, see 
Mian and Sufi 2018). 
Yet the financial instruments available in financial markets to control this 
 globally omnipresent risk remain in a state of infancy. For example, consider a 
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homebuyer circa 2005 or 2006 who faced conflicting expert opinions about whether 
housing prices might fall in the near-term. For example, McCarthy and Peach (2004) 
and Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005) argue that house prices were not going 
to collapse. Conversely, Shiller (2006) presents ample historical evidence that house 
prices at the time were far from the norm suggested by historical patterns, and Shiller 
(2005) writes: “Significant further rises in these [housing] markets could lead, even-
tually, to even more significant declines.” But that concerned homebuyer had no 
mechanism to hedge against the risk that the price of the specific house they were 
purchasing would decline. Nor did investors purchasing mortgage-backed securities 
have any straightforward way to hedge against the risk of a widespread decline in the 
average property prices, either within an urban area, region, or nationally.
The main objective of this paper is to offer a perspective on the principal 
 obstacles hindering the development of financial derivatives based on real estate 
prices---especially housing prices---and what could be done to overcome these 
difficulties. By the late 1980s, Case and Shiller (1989) started a research agenda 
dedicated to the search for financial solutions that could mitigate house price risk. 
We first provide an overview of some basic financial derivatives and their 
benefits. We then discuss some history about the volatility of property prices and 
their interaction with the financial sector. Between 1870 and the middle of the 
20th century, available data suggest that real house prices remained fairly stable in 
many places worldwide (Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor 2015). Some financial deriv-
atives were then developed to reduce the risk for originators of mortgages. But 
the lack of development of financial derivatives based directly on property prices 
probably had only a modest effect up to the 1970s, when a combination of infla-
tionary and real increases in housing prices shook up these markets. We discuss 
early attempts to create property derivatives in the 1990s, which either failed or 
were very limited in scope. However, after 2006 a functional market did emerge in 
real estate derivatives, both in the United States (on housing) and in the United 
Kingdom (on commercial property). We discuss the empirical evidence on benefits 
that have arisen from these financial derivatives as well as their flaws and limitations. 
Finally, we then discuss the main specific obstacles to a more complete devel-
opment of a property derivatives market: problems in matching a suitable property 
index to the property derivatives themselves, concerns about a limited number of 
parties in the market, problems of modelling property derivatives, and concerns 
about how regulations may affect the participation of large financial institutions 
in these markets. Our study is complementary to the review of housing finance in 
Shiller (2014), where the slow pace of innovation with respect to the development 
of tools for controlling property risk is also criticized.
Advantages of Real Estate Derivatives 
A number of studies starting with Case and Shiller (1989) have pointed out 
the benefits of introducing property derivatives---for housing prices in particular. 
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Examples focused on the US market include Shiller (1993c) and Shiller and Weiss 
(1999), while Case, Shiller, and Weiss (1991, 1993) explain the need for house price 
index futures and options. For the case of the United Kingdom, Gemmill (1990) 
argues for the benefits of futures trading for the house price market in the United 
Kingdom and Baum (1991) make the case for commercial property futures (see 
also Thomas 1996). Table 1 provides a quick definition of some common financial 
derivatives. In this section, we discuss four types of gains that financial derivatives 
provide: 1) improved information about the path of future prices, 2) hedging 
against risk, 3) a tool for broadening investment portfolios, and 4) a basis for new 
financial products. 
Information about the Future of Evolution of Property Prices
The principal role of property derivatives is that they allow end-users to 
extract more reliable information about the future evolution of property prices. 
Of course, for the introduction of property derivatives (residential and commer-
cial) to be successful, their usage must appeal to sophisticated market players who 
find it advantageous to take on property risk such as hedge funds, pension funds, 
Table 1 




An agreement to buy or sell a 
certain asset at a certain price at a 
specific date in the future.
An airline, agreeing to buy fuel in the future at a 
certain price; a farmer, agreeing to sell a crop in 
the future at a certain price. If the contract is on 
an exchange there are margin payments subject 
to a marking-to-market process that must be paid 
in order to remove counterparty risk, and this 
is a futures contract. If the contract is directly 
between two parties over-the-counter then the 
contract is paid off only at maturity. Futures are 
standardized while forwards are bespoken. 
Call option The right to purchase an underlying 
security at a predetermined future 
time and “strike price.”
Some companies grant workers a call option to 
purchase company stock in the future at a certain 
strike price.
Put option The right to sell an underlying secu-
rity at a specified price and date. 
A put option on the S&P 500 can be exercised 
by the holder if the value of the S&P500 at some 
future maturity falls below the chosen exercise 
threshold. Hence, an asset manager may recoup 
portfolio losses by buying a put as a hedge against 
a market decline. 
Total return 
swap
The “payer” agrees to send the total 
return from a certain asset to the 
“receiver,” and the “receiver” agrees 
to either a make a payment based 
on a benchmark interest rate or the 
total return on a different asset.
An asset manager agrees to pay a funding market 
floating rate plus a fixed spread to a counterparty 
in return for the return on some property index. 
Basically, the asset manager creates a leveraged 
position in the property index funded at LIBOR 
plus the fixed spread. 
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insurance funds and speculators. Such market players provide deep pockets that 
help to keep the market liquid along with deep expertise in valuation of assets.
Voicu and Seiler (2013) and Uluc (2018) investigate the theoretical impact of 
introducing house price futures on managing house price risk. For example, Uluc 
(2018) adapts the De Long et al. (1990) model of noise traders to the housing 
market: that is, the market is made up of noise traders who have imperfectly predict-
able beliefs about waves of property values up and down and sophisticated investors 
who try to predict the noise traders—and in doing so, the sophisticated investors can 
magnify the size of the waves. The model demonstrates that there are three channels 
by which house price futures may affect house prices. First, the noise traders who are 
looking to benefit from momentum in prices no longer need to purchase houses 
themselves but can now focus on trading the financial derivative of housing futures. 
The market for buying and selling actual houses is slow and somewhat illiquid, while 
trades in the synthetic (paper) domain are settled very quickly. Depending on the 
noise traders’ perception of the market, it is possible for house price futures trading 
to trigger either an increase or decrease in the price volatility of residential property. 
Second, a housing futures market allows for short selling. Thus, when noise traders 
begin to display irrational exuberance, they become the only market players buying 
in expectation of higher housing prices, while sophisticated (knowledgeable) house-
holds and investors use house price futures for short-selling for the investment part 
of the housing asset—and during that time are more likely to rent than to buy. Third, 
Uluc (2018) argues that when house price futures overall become attractive to sophis-
ticated investors, the volatility of house prices decreases. Moreover, the presence of 
sophisticated risk-neutral investors in this model will in the long run eliminate the 
imperfections and distortions in the housing market. 
A market in property derivatives can also clarify certain prices that are now 
bundled together. For example, Case and Shiller (1996) explain how financial 
institutions and investors could use futures and options to extract information and 
manage two major interrelated risks that lenders face: price risk and default risk. 
Hedging Housing Price Risk
Property derivatives offer certain end users the opportunity to hedge or control 
property-related risks—perhaps especially those concerned about a price fall. An 
obvious use would be that some homebuyers, at the time they purchase their house, 
might wish to purchase an insurance policy against the risk of a decline in house 
prices. Shiller and Weiss (1999) expanded this idea to explain how residential prop-
erty futures would facilitate the selling of home equity insurance. Hence, house 
price futures, for example, could help insurance companies remove the risk of 
endemic house price declines. The existence of house price futures may allow the 
coexistence of another financial innovation: insurance that you will not lose the 
value of the down payment on your home and even price guarantees on new homes. 
Shiller (1993c) put forth theoretical arguments for this financial innovation which 
almost ten years later proved to be effective in 2002 in Syracuse, New York, when a 
home equity insurance program was launched (Caplin et al. 2003).
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In addition, residential property derivatives could be employed by mortgage 
insurers to hedge the risk of higher defaults that occur when housing prices fall 
(Case et al. 1993; Case and Shiller 1996). All major banks are now required to pass 
regular stress tests imposed by regulators and some of these tests involve severe 
house price market collapses. Thus, using house price derivatives could be a solu-
tion to mitigate the banks’ overall portfolio downside risk exposure in order to pass 
stress tests.
One can also imagine those who wish to hedge against a rising price of housing. 
Say that a young household lives in an area where real estate prices seem to be rising 
faster than incomes, but they are not yet ready to purchase a home. By purchasing 
housing futures based on an index of local real estate prices, or an option, they can 
reduce the chance of being “priced out” of a real estate market where prices are 
rising. 
Portfolio and Investment Decisions
When seeking to optimize an investment strategy, property derivatives provide 
an additional tool with distinctive characteristics of risk and return. For example, 
some investors might seek to acquire exposure to real estate profit and losses in 
a synthetic manner, in this way obtaining exposure to real estate sectors where it 
would be almost impossible to trade on the spot market (like shopping centers and 
warehouses). Other possible actions could involve moving between asset classes or 
sectors or “relative value trading” where the investor seeks to benefit from a change 
in the spread between the outcome of the property derivative and some other asset. 
As Englund (2010) pointed out, property derivatives would enable households to 
disentangle their housing consumption decisions from their housing investment 
decisions: for example, a renter could use property derivatives to benefit from rising 
real estate prices. 
The development of property derivatives markets has been hampered by the 
fact that, for long periods of time, property markets were one-sided—specifically, 
with a lack of investors willing to be counterparties in property derivatives transac-
tions. But with a market for property derivatives, investment banks and investment 
funds should be willing to buy the property risk because they cannot plausibly claim 
that they are fully diversified without holding positions in property markets. For 
investors who want to use property derivatives for managing their exposure to this 
asset class, one of the major problems in trading in this asset class is the lack of 
fungibility and the implied impossibility of short selling of the spot asset. As noted 
earlier, not being able to short-sell an asset when market values appear to be inflated 
relative to fundamentals may be a direct contributor to increased market sentiment, 
ultimately resulting in real estate bubbles. 
New Financial Products: Reverse Mortgages
The discussion has already mentioned how property derivatives can provide a 
basis for new financial products like down-payment insurance. Another emerging 
financial product where housing price risk is highly relevant is “reverse mortgages,” 
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in which a homeowner receives periodic payments for a fixed period or life, secured 
by the value of the property that will be sold after death. Reverse mortgages may 
be especially beneficial for elderly households with low-income, poor health, and 
limited non-housing wealth (Nakajima and Telyukova 2017). The UK equivalent of 
a reverse mortgage is called an “equity release mortgage.” It allows the borrower, 
a senior person over a certain age, to get a lump-sum or to draw regular or when-
needed sums from a credit line. The loan accrues interest that will be paid only 
at the termination event, when the borrower dies, moves into long-term care, or 
prepays. The loan can be granted to individuals or couples who own and live in a 
house that is used as a collateral to pay back the loan at termination.
However, an obvious concern for the reverse mortgage market is the risk of a 
decline in property values. In a US-style reverse mortgage, the issuer must embed 
in the deal an insurance policy against a house price decline. This insurance policy 
serves several functions: that the borrower will not absorb the negative equity when 
the loan is terminated, that the loan will continue to pay its installments even if the 
lender goes bankrupt, and that the reinsurer will pay the lender if the negative equity 
guarantee insurance policy is triggered. In essence, these products depend crucially 
on a put option on the house price at an uncertain time in the future (which can be 
priced depending on the actuarial characteristics of the borrower), along with a strike 
price equal to the accumulated balance at a fixed rate. In the United Kingdom, the 
regulator requires the insurer issuing the loan to cover the risk that the house price at 
termination is lower than the loan balance to be repaid. 
Because an expanding market for reverse mortgages is highly dependent on 
the no-negative equity guarantee, house price hedging instruments would help to 
satisfy regulators and help improve the linkages between the housing market and 
the health care market (Tunaru 2017). This problem could be solved immediately 
if a futures contract on house prices existed, along with the use of put options.1 
But with such markets still at their early stages, the price of providing a no-negative 
equity guarantee remains higher than it needs to be, thus impeding growth of the 
market for reverse mortgages.
Why Did the Need for Real Estate Derivatives Rise in the 1970s?
Over time, many assets have served as a basis for derivative contracts, including 
stock prices, bond prices, and commodities prices like oil or wheat. One reason why 
house prices have not done so is that house prices in the majority of developed 
1  In the UK market for equity release mortgages, for example, regulators accept the application of the 
Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model to evaluate the risks. However, it is well-accepted among 
researchers and industry that with this approach, the valuations of the necessary house price options are 
quite inflated due to the way the Black-Scholes model builds in volatility. Regulators naturally prefer to 
be conservative. In contrast, insurers argue that the very high capital limits imposed are impeding the 
development of this market. Issues with appropriate modelling of property derivatives will be discussed 
in more detail later in this paper.
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economies remained relatively constant in real terms from the 19th century to the 
1960s (Knoll, Schularick, and Steger 2017). Of course, there’s a lot of detail buried in 
that word “relatively.” Knoll, Schularick, and Steger (2017) provide ample evidence 
that house prices stayed stable before World War I, although income per capita 
increased and then, relative to income, they decreased until the 1960s. Glaeser (2013) 
argues that the United States has been, for a long time, a nation of property specula-
tors, with local and regional boom-bust periods that created substantial social costs 
and financial instability. However, these movements in housing prices often evened 
out in the long run. As one example, using a repeat sales index based on 86 proper-
ties in New York City’s borough of Manhattan over a century, Wheaton, Baranski, 
and Templeton (2009) show that in every decade, property prices increased between 
20 and 50 percent and then declined the same way such that in the late 2000s, real 
estate in that city was worth almost the same as at the turn of the 19th century in 
real terms. The international historical evidence suggests that, since 1870, house 
prices in Australia outpaced income; in the United States and European countries 
like Belgium, Sweden, and Germany, house price growth was substantially behind 
income growth; and for Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom, house prices grew 
more or less in line with income (Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor 2015). 
Still, the fact that house prices in high-income countries were “relatively” 
constant for a sustained time means that the perceived need for financial derivatives 
to hedge against movements in these prices was not large. This may explain why 
there was little motivation for introducing futures contracts related to house prices.
Moreover, there is a long history of other financial instruments that protected 
the originators of mortgage loans from risk of fluctuating housing prices by creating 
financial securities based on a pool of mortgage loans, which can then be sold to 
investors. The primary historical example is covered bonds: these debt securities 
are specialized instruments issued by financial institutions under specific legisla-
tive measures. Covered bonds are basically a hybrid between corporate bonds and 
mortgage-backed securities. The collateral for a covered bond is a pool of mort-
gage loans (commercial and residential) and some other public sector assets. The 
payments to the holders of covered bonds are a liability of the issuer. Covered 
bonds may receive a credit rating higher than the issuer’s credit rating, although 
the credit rating mainly reflects the issuer. This apparent paradox can be explained 
by the legislative measures supporting covered bonds. Unlike corporate bonds, the 
mortgage loans are segregated to the benefit of the security holders so that the 
credit of the covered bonds also depends on the credit quality of the collateral. 
Covered bonds were first issued in Germany (then Prussia) in 1769 where they are 
called pfandbriefe, and in 1797 in Denmark where they are called realkreditobligationer 
(Kothari 2012). Covered bonds are commonly used today in many European coun-
tries. They are now issued in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, but rarely issued 
in the United States (although after the subprime mortgage crisis, the US Depart-
ment of the Treasury formulated a plan to promote the issuance of covered bonds). 
From a global perspective, covered bonds constitute the largest bond market after 
the US bond market. 
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In Table 2, we contrast the two main forms of property loans securitization, 
covered bonds and the mortgage-backed securities more common in the United 
States. In a US context, mortgage-backed securities have a much shorter history. 
US mortgage securitization was first used in the 1920s by insurance companies who 
issued mortgage participation certificates backed by a pool of mortgage loans that 
they guaranteed (Goetzmann and Newman 2010). Up until the real estate crash 
that accompanied the Great Depression, these securities were actively traded. 
The Great Depression triggered spectacular innovations in mortgage designs in 
the United States. Until that time, mortgages were not fully amortized; instead, they 
were balloon instruments in which the principal was only partially amortized (or 
not amortized at all) at maturity. Thus, the end of the mortgage left the homeowner 
with the problem of refinancing the balance and exposed the lender to consider-
able default risk. Sometimes the lender (typically a depository institution at the 
time) had the power to require repayment of the outstanding balance on demand 
or upon relatively short notice, even if the mortgager had been making payments 
on time. This type of mortgage designed proved disastrous during the Great Depres-
sion and contributed to both its depth and personal distress, as banks afflicted by 
losses on their loans and by depositors’ withdrawals found it necessary to liquidate 
their mortgage loans at a time when debtors found it impossible to refinance. The 
disastrous experience led to the widespread adoption of the current fixed-rate, level 
payment, fully amortized mortgage by the mid-1930s. As Fabozzi and  Modigliani 
(1992) note, the level-payment mortgage was a great success, contributing to the 
recovery of the housing market after the Great Depression. This mortgage design 
continued to perform a valuable role in financing residential real estate in the first 
two decades of the post-World War II period until the inception of the era of high 
inflation in the 1970s. 
Table 2 
Two Forms of Property Loans Securitization: Covered Bonds and Mortgage-
Backed Securities 
Characteristic Covered bonds Mortgage-backed securities
Asset composition Defined by law and 
substitutable
Cannot be exchanged  
after issuance
Support from issuer Allowed use of other  
assets by issuer
Not allowed
Balance sheet On issuer’s balance sheet Off balance sheet
Issuer’s absorption of 
 default risk
Yes Only pro-rata to their  
equity tranche
Issuer’s absorption of  
 prepayment risk
Yes No
Number of issuances from 
one collateral pool
Multiple issuances allowed One pool one issuance.
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During this time, one of the main changes in housing finance was an effort 
to develop a secondary mortgage market in the United States. The Government 
National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) and the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae) were created in 1968 and then the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) followed in 1970. These three entities worked 
with qualified mortgage originators to create mortgage-backed securities that were 
guaranteed by one of these entities. These “agency mortgage pass-through securi-
ties” represented the first generation of mortgage-backed securities. Later, other 
mortgage originators issued securities that were backed solely by the credit quality 
of the underlying mortgage pool, referred to as private-label, mortgage-backed 
securities. It was not until the 1990s that the first mortgage-backed securities backed 
by a pool of commercial mortgage loans were issued.
However, the fixed-rate, level payment, fully amortized mortgage—and the 
mortgage-backed securities based on it—were unprepared when the inflation of 
the 1970s produced devastating effects on the housing industry in all countries.2 
Adjustable-rate mortgages shifted the risks of inflation to borrowers, rather than 
lenders. But the rise in mortgage interest rates that accompanied, and roughly 
matched, the rise in inflation pushed homeownership out of the reach of major 
segments of the population—notably the young and the first-time homebuyers. 
Various alternative mortgage designs sought to deal with the “tilt problem” created 
by inflation: specifically when nominal house prices rise over time, a standard mort-
gage then causes the purchaser to have a higher real value of mortgage payments 
in the earlier years, resulting in potential cash flow problems for homeowners that 
will increase the risk of default. Several mortgage designs (with many variants) were 
developed that led to mortgages with systematically higher real payments over time, 
including graduated payment mortgages, growing equity mortgages, tiered payment 
mortgages, shared appreciation mortgages, price-level adjustment mortgages, and 
dual rate mortgages (Fabozzi and Modigliani 1992). 
By the 1980s, the financial sector had certainly recognized that a number of 
financial risks had increased and needed to be hedged, both in the property sector 
and from other areas. The property markets in the United States and the United 
Kingdom became more integrated with their financial markets. In the United 
2 The savings and loan crisis of the 1980s and 1990s was not directly related to changes in property 
prices. Instead, the key problem was that savings and loan institutions held large portfolios of fixed-
rate mortgages, and under existing laws in the early 1980s, they faced a regulatory limit on the interest 
rate they could pay on deposits. When US inflation and nominal interest rates rose dramatically in the 
1970s, savings and loans faced a double-whammy: their deposits flowed away to money market funds, 
which could pay higher nominal interest rates, and the value of their fixed-rate mortgage assets declined 
sharply (for discussion, see the three-paper “Symposium on Federal Deposit Insurance” in the Fall 1989 
issue of this journal). However, the savings and loan debacle does illustrate a case where issues in the 
mortgage finance industry led to development of financial derivatives. The development of the interest 
rate swap market in the 1980s—which made it much easier to exchange fixed-rate and variable-rate 
securities—is primarily attributable to the need to manage interest risk emerging from the fixed-rate 
mortgage loan portfolios that were common in the 1970s and earlier. 
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Kingdom, for example, the Housing Act of 1980 introduced a right-to-buy policy 
that transformed the UK residential market from a majority of renters to a majority 
of houseowners. Then 1983 brought the “Big Bang” deregulation of the financial 
sector (Coakley 1994) at a time when UK bank systems became the custodians of 
large portions of property risk through large mortgage origination programs. 
Many futures contracts were introduced on exchanges throughout the world 
in the 1980s, including those for the purpose of managing the risks associated 
with various types of assets from commodities to stock indices and Treasury bonds. 
But somehow, there were no attempts to introduce futures related to the price of 
property, whether in the form of residential houses or commercial property. One 
futures contract of this time was tangentially related to real estate: the Government 
National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) Collateralized Depositary Receipt 
(CDR) futures contract. However, this contract focused on interest rates, not 
property prices. The main users of this contract were mortgage bankers who were 
holding large undiversified mortgage portfolios which they intended to resell in 
the secondary market. This financial contract was a modest success for a few years, 
but then the bulk of investors interested in taking positions on interest rates shifted 
to a futures contract based directly on US Treasury bonds instead. The story of 
the  six-year rise and fall of the GNMA CDR interest rate futures contract is told in 
 Johnston and McConnell (1989). 
However, another property derivative from this time would last longer. Due 
to the option granted to borrowers to prepay their loan in whole or in part at 
any time and without penalty, there was considerable uncertainty about what the 
actual maturity of a mortgage pass-through security might end up being. This 
“prepayment risk” could result in a security with either a very short maturity or an 
extremely long maturity. Prepayment risk made mortgage pass-through securities 
unappealing to traditional investors. In the early 1980s, a new type of mortgage-
backed security was created called a collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO) 
to deal with prepayment risk and the uncertainty of maturities. A CMO was made 
up of different bond classes (popularly referred to as tranches) backed by a pool 
of mortgage loans, and it had a set of rules for the distribution of the interest and 
principal payments to the different bond classes. The rules were such that some of 
the bond classes carried more prepayment risk than others. When issued by Ginnie 
Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, there was no concern with credit risk. Other 
entities also issued CMOs, referred to as private-label CMOs, where the different 
bond classes had a different credit rating and there were rules not only for the 
distribution of the interest and principal payments but the allocation of losses to 
the different bond classes. Overall, these securities resulted in a redistribution of 
credit risk as well as prepayment risk. The wide range of risk profiles made these 
securities more appealing to a wide range of institutional investor seeking targeted 
risk profiles. Unfortunately, it was private-label CMOs backed by a pool of mort-
gage loans consisting of borrowers with impaired credit ratings (that is, subprime 
borrowers), which were a main part of the story behind the subprime mortgage 
crisis of 2007–2008 (Fabozzi 2015, Chapter 11). 
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The volatility of real house prices had started increasing substantially after 
the 1970s: one principal reason is the strong increase in residential land prices 
following World War II (Knoll, Schularick, and Steger 2017). From the late 1980s 
up to the 2007 subprime crisis and the Great Recession, the rate of growth of real 
house prices was significantly faster than the rate of income growth.3 However, 
this rise has been unequally distributed across locations. Metcalf (2018) reports 
the changes in the real median house prices for the core-based areas in the 
United States between 1996 and 2016. The percentage increase varied from 16 
percent in Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell to 75 percent in New York-Newark-
Jersey City and a maximum of 168 percent in San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward. 
Thus, many households found themselves in a situation where housing equity 
represented a large proportion of their personal wealth and where housing 
equity also seemed like an asset with a degree of risk it would be unwise to 
disregard. 
From the standpoint of the financial sector and the economy as a whole, the 
total wealth tied up in real estate is extremely high in all developed economies. 
Since 1870, for the majority of developed economies, the banking sector has grad-
ually moved from business loans to mortgage loans, particularly after World War 
II. In western countries, total mortgage loans outstanding have risen (on average) 
from about 20 percent of annual GDP at the beginning of the 20th century, 
increasing to 70 percent of GDP by 2010 (Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor 2015). 
The value of US real estate owned by households and nonprofits (that is, not 
counting property owned by firms) is approximately $30 trillion (Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors 2019), approaching the value of the US equity market. The 
estimated value of all developed real estate worldwide, including residential, 
commercial, and agricultural land is $217 trillion (Savills 2016). However, in 2014, 
considering all futures and options contracts traded at 78 exchanges around the 
world, the contracts targeting the property cash market are counted in the “other” 
category, representing less than 1.4 percent of all derivatives traded (according to 
the Futures Industry Association website at http://www.fia.org). Hence, there is a 
clear mismatch between property’s market value and the existing property deriva-
tives’ notional amount. In addition, there is continued uncertainty as to how well 
the economies of high-income countries will survive another large, risky event 
associated with real estate markets. The need to build and strengthen markets in 
property derivatives is clear. 
3 One possible explanation proffered by Glaeser, Kolko, and Saez (2001) is urbanization. However, that 
explanation may be more true in some countries than others. For example, for the United States in 
1900, 30 percent of the population resided in cities, increasing by 2010 to 80 percent of the population. 
In Germany in 1910, 60 percent of the population resided in cities, increasing to 75 percent by 2010. In 
contrast, in the United Kingdom, the cities were occupied by 77 percent of the population in the early 
20th century and remained at that same level (approximately 79.5 percent) in 2010 (United Nations 
2014; US Bureau of the Census 1975; General Register Office 1951).
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Evolution of Real Estate Derivatives
Early Failures and Baby Steps
The first attempt to introduce a standardized house price futures contract 
occurred in August 1990 when Karl Case, Robert Shiller, and Allan Weiss, under 
the umbrella of the Case Shiller Weiss Research Group, proposed to the Coffee, 
Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange a futures market on single-family homes (Shiller 2008). 
A few months later in November 1990, the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) was 
presented with a similar idea (Jud and Winkler 2009), and Case Shiller and Weiss, 
Inc. investigated jointly with the CBOT the feasibility of launching a house price 
futures market. However, a survey in 1993 clearly indicated that the house price 
market was very one-sided: that is, there were plenty of investors willing to purchase 
futures contracts to protect themselves against a decline in housing prices, but not 
so many investors who wanted to sell such contracts, leading the CBOT to decide 
against launching a house price futures contract at that time.
At almost the same time, the London Futures and Options Exchange (FOX) 
introduced several property-related futures contracts in May 1991, including 
a housing futures contract and futures contracts based on prices and rents for a 
commercial real estate. However, these contracts did not last long. The underlying 
data series for the house price futures contract was the Nationwide House Price 
index (NAHP), where the index was constructed using data from home sales on 
which the Nationwide Anglia Building Society (since 1992, Nationwide) originated 
mortgage loans (Baum 1991). However, the index became contaminated by unlawful 
efforts to boost volume by employing “wash trades”—that is, trades in which a single 
investor is buying and selling equivalent amounts of the contract at the same time, 
which can be a way to push misleading information into the market. This manipula-
tive practice led to the termination of this contract in October 1991 (Shiller 2008). 
The commercial property derivatives were terminated at the same time. 
In late 1994, the London Futures and Options Exchange attempted to intro-
duce other real estate derivatives based on an index from IPD (Investment Property 
Databank) but without great success. Barclays de Zoete Wedd introduced Property 
Index Certificates (PICs) that were later renamed Property Linked Notes because 
they were effectively euro-bonds that would replicate IPD returns when traded at 
par (Lizieri et al. 2012).
In 2001, the United Kingdom witnessed the introduction of a betting market 
based on house prices by the City Index Group and a year later by the IG Index 
Ltd. Because these markets were perceived as mainly betting opportunities rather 
than as hedging instruments, trading has been sparse over the years. In May 2005, 
the Cantor Index, created by a division of Cantor Fitzgerald Group, started offering 
betting on house prices based on the Average Greater London and Average UK 
House Price markets. 
In the United States, the so-called “hedgelets,” promoted by HedgeStreet in 
October 2004, were futures-type contracts offered online to small investors who had 
strong convictions on the direction of specific economic indicators (De Aenlloe 
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2004). These contracts could be used by individuals to make bets in $10 increments 
on the future direction of house prices. The contracts that individuals could use 
to bet on the future direction of house prices had a binary or digital character-
istic: specifically, the contract was based on whether the housing price index from 
the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) in one of six cities 
would fall into a given range on a specific date over the next three months. Such a 
contract implied that if the index failed to fall within the designated range, half of 
the participants lost their entire investment. 
The Arrival of House Price Futures and Options
The first lasting house price futures contract finally arrived on May 22, 2006, 
when the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) started trading house futures 
contracts and options based on the family of S&P/Case-Shiller® Home Price Indices, 
which covered both a national composite index and 10 major cities.4 This initial 
contract was a joint collaboration of the CME and MacroMarkets LLC. In February 
2008, Standard & Poor’s acquired the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices from 
MacroMarkets LLC. 
For the US commercial real estate market, Standard & Poor’s and Global Real 
Analytics/Charles Schwab Investment Management constructed the S&P/GRA 
Commercial Real Estate Indices (Labuszewski and Souza 2007), which were then 
used by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in November 2007 as the underlying 
basis for a futures contract. The intention was to trade commercial property futures 
on the office, warehouse, apartment, and retail property sectors, and more widely 
for the nation (as well as for the Northeast, Midwest, mid-Atlantic South, Pacific 
West, and Desert Mountain West regions) with electronic trading out 20 quarters. 
Trading volume in the S&P/GRA commercial property index futures has been very 
low. This is probably attributable to the diversity of commercial property indices in 
the United States, given that there are many indices constructed in different ways, 
all competing for the interest of market participants.
In the United Kingdom, only one commercial real estate index was recognized 
by market participants: the family of commercial property indices published by the 
IPD. The trading of total return swaps on various IPD country indices started the 
over-the-counter market in January 2005. According to Jud and Winkler (2009), 
total return swaps were also traded where the underlying was a commercial property 
index for the countries of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, 
and Switzerland, with about £17.3 billion (notional value) of swaps referencing the 
IPD UK index. 
One of the most successful property derivatives so far has been futures contracts 
on the IPD family of commercial real estate indices traded on EUREX in London 
4 The 10 cities with their initial weighting in the composite index are Boston (7.4 percent), Chicago 
(8.8 percent), Denver (3.6 percent), Las Vegas (1.4 percent), Los Angeles (21.1 percent), Miami 
(4.9 percent), New York (27.2 percent), San Diego (5.5 percent), San Francisco (11.7 percent) and 
Washington, DC (7.8 percent).
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(Fabozzi and Tunaru 2017). One possible explanation for the relative success 
of this contract is the fact that the IPD family of indices was and still is widely 
regarded as the main representative index family for commercial real estate in 
the United Kingdom. The IPD index construction methodology was extended 
to other countries such as Germany and France. (By contrast, the multitude of 
US commercial real estate indices may be detrimental to the innovation of new 
derivatives financial instruments.) The contracts as initially launched in February 
2009 were annual contracts based on the total returns of the IPD UK Annual All 
Property index for individual calendar years. There are futures related to various 
property portfolios covered by IPD such as the composite level (UK All Property), 
sector level (UK office, UK retail, and UK industrial), and sub-sector level (UK 
retail warehouse, UK shopping centres, London city offices, London west end 
and mid-town offices, and south-east industrial). One important change that has 
occurred is the 2015 takeover by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI)
of the IPD. MSCI then changed the underlying IPD UK Annual Return All Prop-
erty index into a quarterly calculation. This change was made to streamline the 
marking-to-market process to be more in line with the dynamics of the property 
index. 
The Subprime Crisis and a Mortgage Derivative on House Price Risk 
Collateralized mortgage obligations were created in the 1980s, as noted in 
the earlier discussion. These securities had often included a mixture of mortgage 
of different risk characteristics. However, as a rise in the issuance of subprime 
mortgages was accompanied by the run-up in housing prices in the early 2000s, 
there was a sharp increase in the number of investors who were willing to take 
one side or the other of the market for mortgage risk. This turn triggered the 
introduction of ABX.HE indices (the initials stand for “asset-backed securities, 
housing equity”). 
These indices, which are determined from 20 subprime mortgage-backed secu-
rities, employ credit default swaps (CDS). A CDS is an agreement whereby the buyer 
of protection makes a payment (called a premium) at a regular frequency to the 
seller of protection. In exchange for the premium, the seller provides some form 
of price protection for some reference entity over a specified time period should a 
credit event (such as bankruptcy) occur. CDS contracts initially provided protection 
for corporate bonds and sovereign bonds, allowing the pricing of credit risk for 
these issuers. In January 2006, Markit Group, Ltd. introduced the ABX.HE indices. 
Each index tracks the CDS contracts on subprime mortgages with a specified credit 
rating at the time the mortgages were originated and issued at a specified time 
(referred to as the “vintage”). For example, ABX.HE BBB tracked the CDS contracts 
for subprime mortgages that received a credit rating of BBB. With the introduction 
of the ABX.HE indices investors were able to obtain transparency about the price of 
subprime mortgage-backed securities by credit rating. Fender and Scheicher (2008) 
describe in more detail how changes in the price of the ABX.HE can be interpreted 
as a barometer for stress in the subprime mortgage market.
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The main risk posed by a credit default swap is counterparty credit risk, which 
is the risk that the seller of protection will not cover the losses in case of a credit 
event. This type of risk appears not to have been on the radar of regulators prior to 
the global financial crisis, but it was managed among big market players through 
collateral posting. Regulators came to recognize this problem when a subsidiary of 
American International Group (AIG Financial Products) lost almost $100 billion 
in 2008 alone (for a more in-depth discussion of the AIG story in this journal, see 
McDonald and Paulson 2015). 
On the positive side, the evolution of prices in the ABX.HE market confirms 
the important role that derivatives contracts can play in providing forward-looking 
information. The contracts were issued twice a year, in January and June, based 
on the securities issued in the preceding months. Starting in 2007 and 2008, for 
example, the prices of contracts issued in June 2006 started falling sharply compared 
to those issued in January 2006—thus showing that the risk of default on subprime 
mortgages was rising sharply. Conversely, the prices on the ABX.HE contracts in 
2009 signalled the end of the subprime crisis. 
Successes and Limitations of the Early Property Derivative Efforts 
The combination of the rise and fall in housing prices, the crisis in subprime 
lending, and the Great Recession, taken together, hobbled the promise of the early 
direct hedging vehicles for real estate risks. The size of the futures and options 
markets for the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index on the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange peaked around the time of the subprime crisis and survives only in a dimin-
ished form. In London and other cities, the IPD swaps market grew dramatically 
until around 2008 but have languished since then. However, in 2009 Eurex launched 
futures contracts on several IPD indices for various sectors of the commercial real 
estate market which are still traded today. Overall, the UK property derivatives market 
has experienced more success than its US counterpart. Torous (2017) offers two 
possible explanations: 1) the UK market has one dominant commercial real estate 
index while the US market has several; and 2) there has been effective lobbying by 
UK property funds to adopt to new more favorable tax legislation.
Studies of the early efforts at creating property derivatives have clearly demon-
strated their potential benefits, for example. Lee, Stevenson, and Lee (2014) and 
Wong, Chau, and Yiu (2007) provide empirical evidence on the stabilizing role of 
property futures on the volatility of spot property markets. Zhu, Pace, and Morales 
(2014) empirically investigate how well market information from the Case-Shiller 
house price futures performed as a forward-looking forecast. Using loan-level mort-
gage data covering over 90 percent of the residential mortgage loans included in 
the mortgage pool of US non-agency securitized deals, they found that forecasts 
extracted from the Case-Shiller house price futures outperformed other proxies 
preferred in the literature and employed in practice, both in sample and out of 
sample. Moreover, the Case-Shiller futures forecasts were the only series implying a 
downward housing price effect that would impact negatively on mortgage default 
behavior. 
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Property derivatives provided institutional investors, such as pension funds 
and insurance funds, a tool to manage their commercial real estate portfolio more 
efficiently. Bertus, Hollans, and Swidler (2008), for example, demonstrate that inves-
tors exposed to house price risk in Las Vegas could have hypothetically have used 
the CME house price index futures to reduce risk by more than 88 percent from 
1994 to 2006 (one year prior to the subprime crisis). Information extracted from 
the price of property derivatives can play an important role in providing expecta-
tions of housing prices that can be used in modelling mortgage defaults. Dolan and 
Hume (2010) show that the CME futures market effectively predicted the home 
price crash in the United States before the news media did.5 Jud and Winkler (2008, 
2009) look at risk and return for an investor who participated in the house price 
futures market. Using daily data on CME-traded house price futures for the period 
May 2006--May 2008, they reported that the returns on futures were positive, even if 
the returns of investing in the spot market were negative. 
Empirical evidence covering a few European countries including the United 
Kingdom also highlights the substantial benefits associated with house price deriva-
tives when utilized to manage risk (Englund, Hwang, and Quigley 2002; Iacoviello 
and Ortalo-Magné 2003; Quigley 2006). These benefits include increasing the finan-
cial system’s stability, and the ability of millions of homeowners to manage property 
risk more cost-effectively (Fabozzi, Shiller, and Tunaru 2009). Bond and Mitchell 
(2011) also find that property derivatives prices outperformed the consensus fore-
casts of future returns in the UK market. 
Obstacles in the Development of Residential Property Derivatives
Several surveys of key players in real estate markets have inquired about the 
reasons for their reluctance to trade property derivatives.6 Here, we focus on what we 
see as some of the most prominent impediments to growing a market for financial 
instruments based on house prices: 1) how real estate indexes may be mismatched 
with the needs of property derivatives; 2) a fear of negligible liquidity; 3) the lack 
of models to price these derivatives; and 4) concerns about an uncertain legislative 
framework vis-à-vis this new derivatives asset class. Along with the four concerns 
discussed here about hindrances to a more robust development of property deriva-
tives, other concerns mentioned in the surveys include a lack of education by house 
5 John H. Dolan, market maker for eight years for the CME Case Shiller home price futures and options 
markets, has a web site, HomePriceFutures.com, that provides regular information about those markets,and 
moderates an online discussion on LinkedIn (the “CME Case Shiller Home Price Futures” group).
6 For example, Lim and Zhang (2006) use a web-based survey of 37 US-based real estate investment 
managers, fund managers, and commercial lenders and brokers to identify the principal reasons for the 
stalling development of property derivatives. Venter (2007) interviews ten UK individuals that included 
tax lawyers, an index provider, investment bankers, brokers, investment advisors, and a property company. 
Puntener (2011) interviews six academic experts, 17 financial and property experts, and two advisors, 
in the United States and United Kingdom. Hanisch (2019) carries out 41 individual interviews and two 
group interviews between June 2016 and March 2017.
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owners on appropriate use of derivatives and the number of asset managers who see 
little need to hedge real estate risk because of the low volatility traditionally associ-
ated with sectors of the real estate market. There was no evidence of regulatory or 
cost barriers that may have deterred potential entrants into the property derivatives 
sector prior to the subprime crisis. However, this has changed in the aftermath of 
the subprime crisis and some stringent regulatory risk measures have been imposed 
on derivatives in general.
Index Construction Mismatch
The construction of a house price index involves a number of choices, which 
in turn affects the financial derivatives that might be built using such an index. For 
example, house price indices can be national or regional, rural or urban, cover new 
or existing homes, or both. Prices for an index might be taken from market house 
sales, which runs the risk of not representing properties with the same characteris-
tics over time. Alternatively, a house price index might use listed prices (whether or 
not a sale results) or appraisals by designated organizations, but these possibilities 
include more subjectivity on what a certain property is “worth.” 
The most widely preferred method is to construct real estate indexes by using 
sales prices, but in a way that adjusts for the quality of the houses being sold. One 
approach is to use hedonic regressions, thus adjusting for key qualities of the house. 
However, real estate has a wide array of unobserved heterogeneity, including aspects 
of location and quality of maintenance and upkeep, so there is reason to doubt 
that the assumptions made when using a hedonic approach are satisfied (Clapham 
et al. 2006). Thus, real estate indexes have mostly converged on the repeat-sales 
approach, which focuses on houses that have been sold at two different points in 
time. Case and Shiller (1987) propose the weighted repeat-sales method: in their 
version, repeat sales that happen with a longer time interval between sales are given 
less weight than repeat sales with smaller time intervals, because the quality of a 
house changes more over longer time periods. The S&P/Case-Shiller® Home Price 
Indices use this approach, and the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 
(OFHEO) publishes a repeated sales index using its own version of the Case-Shiller 
approach. 
The problem arises because a standard futures contract, like the CME house 
price futures contract, is based on the initial value of the real estate index (CME 
2007a, b). Over the life of the futures contract, new information is gathered on 
contemporaneous paired sales. This new information most likely will create changes 
in the estimates of the house price index value in all previous periods. A large 
discrepancy can arise between futures settled on the initial value of the index and 
those settled on the revised value of the spot index. This potential discrepancy is 
sensitive to details of how the index is weighted and calculated (Shiller 1993a, b; 
Deng and Quigley (2008). 
Problems in matching the timing of the real estate index to the property deriva-
tive can arise in a number of ways. In the United Kingdom, property futures traded 
on the IPD exchange use a December year-end maturity for five years ahead, but 
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a post-March publication date for the real estate index: hence, there is a three-
month period mismatch between the calculation period (December to December) 
and the information period (March to March). Another design problem for the 
IPD futures contracts was that the futures were traded on the IPD UK Annual total 
return index, while the marking-to-market was done on the IPD UK Monthly total 
return index. The latter index covered only a subsample of about 80 percent of the 
annual IPD index. The acquisition of IPD by the MSCI in 2012 had implications for 
the commercial real estate index family: the major change involved switching to a 
quarterly valuation. As another example, the existing MSCI UK Quarterly property 
index captures total returns of directly held standing property investment, based on 
tracking the performance of 8,913 property investments, cumulating to £160 billion 
by June 2019. 
The ties between calculation of real estate indexes and the property derivatives 
based on those indexes are real ones. For example, using an extensive repeat-sales 
database for the Paris housing market, Baroni, Barthélémy, and Mokrane (2008) 
show that the revision problem may cause concern about the stability of some key 
parameters. However, the magnitude of the impact of revision on the property price 
indexes is not so substantial so as to make market participants pull out of property 
derivatives that would protect them against severe market downturns.
Negligible Liquidity: Missing One Side of the Market? 
Most real estate owners recognize that they have made a long-term invest-
ment in an asset they will some day wish to sell at the spot price, and so they 
are at least potentially interested in property derivatives to hedge against the risk 
of falling prices. In addition, Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2015) show that in 
developed economies, by 2010, mortgage credit on the balance sheets of banks 
represented about 60 percent of assets on average. Moreover, the stress testing 
that has been introduced for systemically important banks and financial insti-
tutions requires those entities to pass an overall portfolio survival test against a 
decline of 30 percent in real estate markets. One way to satisfy the regulators 
would be to purchase an option on the major real estate indices that would only 
pay off after a substantial decline in property values. If such an option was traded 
regularly, liquidity in the property derivative market would receive a welcome 
boost. In general, futures contracts have provided a reliable vehicle to offset risk 
in capital markets. For property markets, futures contracts also allow investors to 
take positions that are equivalent to short-selling the property market, which is 
not possible to do in the spot markets for property.
But at first glance, it is unclear who should be the counterparty in those property 
derivatives trades: that is, who is willing to provide insurance against a fall in prop-
erty prices or hedge against a rise in prices? Of course, a property derivatives market 
cannot flourish without participants on both sides. Any investor who has exposure to 
a drop in property prices should be interested in offsetting possible losses on their 
exposure with the financial gains from a position in property derivatives. This is the 
case for typical homeowners, real estate financial houses, institutional investors in 
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mortgage-backed securities, pension funds invested in property portfolios, insurance 
funds using property investments for their asset-liability management, and building 
societies who carry mortgages on their balance sheet.
One can conjure up hypothetical examples for the other side of the market 
easily enough: as mentioned earlier, one can imagine young people, who expect to 
buy their first home when they are ready in the future, might use property deriva-
tives to start investing in property synthetically to avoid being priced out of the 
market. Homeowners in one city who feel they will eventually move to some other 
city might combine a short position, that is, selling the futures contract in their 
current city, with a long position, that is, buying the futures contract in a national 
home index price. Providers of “target date” retirement funds might provide such a 
service, perhaps adjusting exposure to real estate risk in the local market and in likely 
retirement destinations as the beneficiary approaches retirement age. However, it 
seems implausible that these kinds of market participants will be substantial enough 
to make up the other side of the property derivatives market. 
More likely, it would be mutual funds, insurance companies, pension funds 
and other managers of large pools of funds who desire to be fully diversified who 
take the other side of the real estate risk on derivatives. The role of speculators and 
sophisticated traders, such as hedge funds and private equity firms, becomes even 
more important to ensure liquidity for property derivatives. Once a market in prop-
erty derivatives is clearly established, it’s also easy to imagine that general investors 
might eventually, after a market is established, be enticed by how the combination 
of risks and returns fits within their broader portfolio. 
Modelling Considerations
Given the non-standard characteristics of real estate indexes and property in 
general by comparison to commodities, equities, bonds, and currency exchange 
rates, it is perhaps not surprising that pricing even straightforward derivatives 
such as futures, put and call options, and total return swaps is not straightforward. 
Many pitfalls and caveats must be considered. For example, many of the models 
used for pricing derivatives depend on a no-arbitrage constraint: thus, the futures 
market for the S&P 500 as a whole is governed by what it would cost to buy the 
portfolio of underlying stocks. But buying a portfolio of houses that replicates a 
well-designed real estate index would be a costly and illiquid investment, so this 
no-arbitrage condition and its implications no longer hold. A standard no-arbitrage 
condition suggests that the relationship between the spot price of the derivative 
and the expected future price will be driven largely by the risk-free rate of return, 
but as Drouhin, Simon, and Essafi (2016) show in a study of IPD total return swaps 
contracts, this relationship does not hold in the context of property prices. Further-
more, without a no-arbitrage condition, the standard Black-Scholes option-pricing 
formula cannot be derived using the classical replication approach. 
Indeed, one argument for the full development of a property derivatives 
market with futures contracts is that it sidesteps what can otherwise be some 
complex and disputable econometric work on valuing derivatives. If property 
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futures do exist in the market, then it becomes possible to set prices for options on 
property prices using the Black (1976) formula. However, market-makers still need 
to decide those prices for futures somehow. While producing different valuations 
of property derivatives may attract more players into this market, market-makers 
need to make defensible decisions that are capable of resisting attempts by various 
other players to drive the market price too high or too low for non-economic 
reasons. Models that can be relied upon for property derivatives markets are 
also models that take into account the econometric features of the spot prop-
erty markets. They must be easy to set up, not highly computationally intensive, 
and characterized by parameters that have a direct interpretation in financial 
terms.
There are currently two schools of thought about the appropriate models to 
price property derivatives. One school considers how to replicate the contingent 
claim of the property derivative given existing prices in the market, along with 
selecting a set of stochastic processes to represent dynamics of the underlying real 
estate index combined with risk-neutral pricing. Examples along these lines include 
Titman and Torous (1989), Buttimer, Kau, and Slawson (1997), Björk and Clapham 
(2002), Otaka and  Kawaguchi (2002), Syz and Vanini (2011), and Fabozzi, Shiller, 
and Tunaru (2012). 
A main challenge in this approach is that the choice of stochastic processes 
to represent dynamics of the underlying real estate index can lead to difficulties. 
One unreliable approach followed in some strands of the literature assumed that 
the underlying property indices or property prices followed a geometric Brownian 
motion. This assumption is inconsistent with the overwhelming empirical evidence 
starting with Case and Shiller (1987, 1989) that indicates that house prices 1) exhibit 
serial correlation and 2) are positively correlated over short horizons and nega-
tively correlated over long horizons. More recent evidence across several markets 
is presented in Tunaru (2017). Mean-reverting processes are capable of generating 
pathways that match these empirical characteristics and they could be more appro-
priate as a starting point for pricing property derivatives as discussed in more detail 
in Fabozzi, Shiller, and Tunaru (2012).
The other school of thought in this literature is defined by various equilib-
rium models. For example, Geltner and Fisher (2007) and Lizieri et al. (2012) 
propose equilibrium-based models for calculating forward prices and the total 
return swap spread. Cao and Wei (2010) sidestep the non-tradability of underlying 
housing indices for the CME-traded housing futures and options by assuming a 
mean-reverting aggregate dividend process and a constant relative risk aversion 
utility function to derive analytical forwards and options prices, equilibrium, and 
no-arbitrage. 
However, this approach also raises questions. Equilibrium models may be 
useful for marking-to-model property derivatives positions, particularly when there 
is no information on the derivatives either due to market closure or crises events. 
However, the connections between a known futures price given by markets and 
corresponding prices of put and call options are based on model-free, no-arbitrage 
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relationships, and Tunaru (2017) provides several examples showing that equilib-
rium prices may not satisfy this requirement. Perhaps the biggest concern is that 
if one of the arguments for property derivatives is as a mechanism to foresee and 
to manage financial crises, it is difficult to reconcile the idea of a market being in 
equilibrium and in a financial crisis at the same time. 
A final concern about modelling futures prices in property derivatives is that 
the market for single-family homes has been one of exceptionally high transactions 
cost and impossibility of short sales, which permit the high level of momentum 
and of apparent bubbles. The transition to a real estate market with functioning 
property derivatives that allow for extensive hedging may well alter the time-series 
properties of the underlying cash price. For that reason, the past time-series proper-
ties of home price indices may not be a good guide to the future. However, one can 
view this as a transition problem, which would become smaller over time as market 
experience increases with property derivatives. 
Regulatory Issues
Before the subprime crisis, a number of large investment banks were involved 
in property total return swaps using over-the-counter trades—for example, Deutsche 
Bank, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and the Royal Bank of Scotland. They were 
satisfied to enter trades with various clients and take the risk on their books for long 
periods of time until they were able to offload those risks.
In the aftermath of the subprime crisis, trading in the property derivatives 
market moved from over-the-counter to exchange-based. In addition, the Basel III 
Accord established a new set of rules requiring banks to allocate additional capital 
for each leg of a derivatives trade. As a result, trading property derivatives became 
very capital intensive. These increased regulatory capital requirements associated 
with property derivatives motivated banks and investment banks to exit this asset 
class. Given ongoing concerns about financial risk, bailouts, and systemic risk, there 
is ongoing concern about future rules that might further discourage large financial 
institutions from participating in property derivatives markets. 
Lessons and Proposals for the Future 
Since the 1970s, property price risk has affected investors and economies with 
increased frequency. Markets in property derivatives are the key to providing both 
investors and lenders with the tools to mitigate property-related risks. However, the 
market for real estate has various characteristics that differentiate it from other asset 
classes where derivatives were successfully introduced. Given the specific economic 
and econometric characteristics of the underlying asset, along with the house price 
and commercial property indexes based on that asset, property derivatives require 
a more complex process to be generally accepted by financial market participants. 
In particular, more needs to be done on the modelling side to facilitate pricing and 
hedging in this incomplete market. The ultimate goal is for property derivatives 
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to be traded as a standard commodity, similar to the way that futures, options, and 
swaps are traded for stock and bond indexes. 
Financial derivatives have sometimes attracted a bad reputation, often after 
prominent financial institutions (like the AIG example with credit default swaps 
mentioned earlier) suffered large losses. Derivatives can allow for high leveraging and 
when events turn bad, may magnify losses. In modern times, the majority of financial 
crises involved in one way or another the use, or rather, the misuse of derivatives. Of 
course, with or without financial derivatives, investors have many ways to underesti-
mate risk and end up with substantial losses. In contrast, during the many times when 
financial derivatives have allowed parties to hedge risk, increase speed, reduce trans-
actions costs, and balance investment portfolios, it has attracted almost no attention. 
By now, derivatives are commonly used worldwide, and their usefulness in spreading 
various types of risk in a sustainable manner is gradually passing the test of time. 
Governments, banks, and other financial institutions have sound reasons to work 
together to give impetus to the development of property derivatives. As the largest 
asset class without corresponding liquid derivatives, property derivatives would offer 
some of the largest benefits from making the leap to a commoditization status. This 
leap would help directly and indirectly provide forward-looking price signals for a 
variety of uses, including their application to stabilizing financial systems, and in this 
way, reduce the risk of market crashes and the resulting economic instability.
The historical development of derivatives markets to deal with the risks 
of other asset classes such as equity, foreign exchange, bonds, commodities and 
credit default swaps, suggests that those derivatives markets were greatly helped by 
a model that was generally adopted by the important market players---the Black-
Scholes (1973) model for valuing equity options being the most notable example. 
As market volume increased, so did the demand for innovation in those markets 
that led to the introduction of more sophisticated models. But currently, property 
derivatives lack a widely accepted model. 
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